Anton Woodward<\/em><\/p>\n When I began working in stage automation in 1988, it was, in many respects, an unregulated frontier.\u00a0There were no harmonised safety standards governing stage and production machinery. Every project was effectively bespoke. Control systems, safety architectures, and validation methods varied widely between suppliers and installations. Much depended on the experience and judgement of individual engineers.\u00a0Systems worked, often impressively, but they relied heavily on competence rather than codified structure.<\/p>\n Looking back, some of it was genuinely unsettling. Not because people were careless. But because the discipline itself had not yet matured. What we lacked was not ingenuity. We lacked a framework. When everything was bespoke, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, each installation felt like a prototype. Safety philosophy was inconsistent. Redundancy strategies were not standardised. Risk assessments were often narrative rather than analytical. Documentation varied considerably. Much depended on \u201cwhat we did last time.\u201d As automation became more ambitious and more widely adopted, the limitations of that approach became increasingly clear, particularly as control systems grew more sophisticated and software became integral to operation.\u00a0The dominant question in those days was: Can we make it move?\u00a0Over time, that evolved into a more important question:\u00a0Can we justify it moving?\u00a0That shift marked the beginning of real maturity.<\/p>\n The development of CEN CWA 15902-1:2008, and its subsequent ratification as BS EN 17206:2020<\/a>, represented a significant turning point. I was involved in the working party that developed the earlier framework. One of the central challenges was achieving balance. There was understandable pressure to adopt highly prescriptive, industrial-style regulatory models. At the same time, theatre operates in varied environments, historic venues, touring productions, temporary installations, often under tight financial constraints. Over-regulation would have risked making automation economically unsustainable for many venues. Under-regulation would have left inconsistency and exposure to risk unresolved.\u00a0The task was to establish proportionate safety: rigorous, defensible, and implementable across the industry. In my view, BS EN 17206:2020<\/a> achieved that balance. It provided a structured framework for risk assessment, safety functions, and responsibility allocation without making compliance impractical.<\/p>\n Control systems today are far more complex than those of the late 1980s. Distributed architectures, networked drives, integrated safety protocols, and significant software abstraction are now routine. In many technical fields, increasing complexity outpaces safety thinking. In stage automation, safety philosophy has largely kept pace.\u00a0Structured risk assessment is now expected. Safety-related control functions are defined and validated. Documentation is regarded as an engineering tool rather than an administrative burden. Responsibility is clearer.\u00a0The discipline matured alongside the technology.<\/p>\n There were practices thirty years ago that would not be acceptable today. Not because engineers lacked integrity, but because there was no shared baseline defining acceptable risk. Those practices have largely disappeared. Dual-channel safety systems, formal validation processes, and compliance with BS EN 17206:2020<\/a> are now considered routine. Engineers entering the industry today understandably regard this as normal.\u00a0It wasn\u2019t always so.\u00a0That normality is a sign of genuine progress.<\/p>\n When I founded AVW in 1996, my aim was not simply to build larger systems, but to make automation more accessible, to move it beyond exceptional, high-budget productions and into a broader range of venues.\u00a0That goal depended on sustainability.\u00a0Safety frameworks must be robust, but they must also be proportionate. If regulation becomes impractical, it does not improve safety; it simply discourages responsible implementation.\u00a0The maturation of standards has allowed automation to become a trusted and expected part of stage infrastructure rather than an experimental addition.<\/p>\n Engineers entering stage automation today inherit a structured and defensible environment. Standards were not inevitable. Proportionality was debated. The alignment between technical complexity and safety philosophy required sustained effort across the industry.\u00a0The frameworks in place today allow creativity to flourish safely.\u00a0They should not be viewed as bureaucracy, but as the foundation that enables ambition.<\/p>\n Since 1988, I have seen stage automation evolve from bespoke, experience-led practice into a structured, standards-based engineering discipline. If today\u2019s environment feels stable and predictable, that is not accidental. It is the result of three decades of collective effort to replace improvisation with accountability. That progress is something the industry should quietly value and continue to protect.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Reflections on Stage Automation Since 1988 Anton Woodward When I began working in stage automation in 1988, it was, in many respects, an unregulated frontier.\u00a0There were no harmonised safety standards governing stage and production machinery. Every project was effectively bespoke. Control systems, safety architectures, and validation methods varied widely between suppliers and installations. Much depended … <\/p>\nThe Move Toward Standards<\/h3>\n
Increasing Complexity \u2014 and Growing Discipline<\/h3>\n
The Disappearance of the \u201cScary\u201d Practices<\/h3>\n
Making Automation Normal<\/h3>\n
A Thought for the Next Generation<\/h3>\n
Final Reflection<\/h3>\n